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HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS AND
PRINCIPALS
CHARLES CLOTFELTER, HELEN F. LADD, JACOB VIGDOR, & JUSTIN
WHEELER*
Although many factors combine to make a successful school, most
people agree that quality teachers and school principals are among
the most important requirements for success, especially when
success is defined by the ability of the school to raise the
achievement of its students. The central question for this study is
how the quality of the teachers and principals in high-poverty
schools in North Carolina compares to that in the schools serving
more advantaged students. A related question is why these
differences emerge. The consistency of the patterns across many
measures of qualifications for both teachers and principals leaves
no doubt that students in the high-poverty schools are served by
school personnel with lower qualifications than those in the lower
poverty schools. Moreover, in many cases the differences are large.
Additional evidence documents that the differences largely reflect
predictable outcomes of the labor market for teachers and
principals. Hence, active policy interventions are needed to counter
these forces if the ultimate goal is to provide equal educational
opportunity.
INTRO D U CTIO N ..................................................................................... 1346
1. DEFINING HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS ..................................... 1350
II. PATTERNS OF TEACHER AND PRINCIPAL QUALITY BY
POVERTY Q UARTILE ................................................................. 1353
A. Patterns of Teacher Qualifications ..................................... 1354
B. Patterns of Principal Quality .............................................. 1359
III. EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS .................................................... 1362
A. Teacher Turnover and Movement ...................................... 1363
B. Principal Turnover and Movement .................................... 1369
* Charles Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, and Jacob Vigdor are professors at the Sanford
Institute of Public Policy, Duke University. Justin Wheeler is an analyst with
Mathematica Policy Research. The authors are grateful to Aaron Hedlund for excellent
research assistance and to the Spencer Foundation for financial support.
1346 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................... 1372
A. Teacher Credentials and Student Achievement ................. 1373
B. Principal Qualifications and Student Achievement .......... 1375
C. Policy Considerations ......................................................... 1377
A PPEN D IX .............................................................................................. 1379
INTRODUCTION
Many previous studies and policy debates have focused attention
on resource disparities in public schooling.' During more than thirty
years of school finance cases, for example, lawyers and policymakers
have objected to wealth-related disparities across school districts in
per pupil spending.2 Further, in the context of civil rights debates,
researchers and policymakers have examined disparities in the
resources available to students of different races.3 Though informed
by those debates, this study differs by its focus on individual schools
rather than districts as the unit of observation, and on poverty rather
than race as the key variable of interest. This study also differs by its
1. See, e.g., JULIAN R. BETTS ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., EQUAL
RESOURCES, EQUAL OUTCOMES? THE DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL RESOURCES AND
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (2001), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
report/R_200JBR.pdf (addressing the distribution of resources and achievement in
California public schools); HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUC. TRUST,
TEACHING INEQUALITY: How POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED
ON TEACHER QUALITY (2006), http://www2.edtrust.org/nr/rdonlyres/01ODBD9F-CED8-
4D2B-9EOD-91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf (discussing and summarizing the
effects of teacher quality on student achievement); Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Who
Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV.
377 (2005) (examining the effect of unequal distribution of inexperienced teachers in
North Carolina schools on the achievement gap between black and white students);
Hamilton Lankford et al., Teacher Sorting and the Plight of Urban Schools: A Descriptive
Analysis, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 37 (2002) (utilizing empirical data
in an effort to demonstrate the vast disparities in teaching quality across New York public
schools).
2. For a comprehensive discussion of relevant school finance cases, see William N.
Evans et al., The Property Tax and Education Finance: Uneasy Compromises, in
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 209, 209-33 (Wallace E.
Oates ed., 2001). See also Paul A. Minorini & Stephen Sugarman, School Finance
Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (outlining the history of school finance litigation and its
significance).
3. Clotfelter et al., supra note 1, at 377. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER,
AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2004)
(examining the disparities in public education even after the Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Brown v. Board of Education); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)
(providing the seminal case study of disparities in educational funding).
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focus on more finely grained measures of two key resources: the
quality of teachers and principals.
Although many factors combine to make a successful school,
quality teachers and school principals are among the most important
requirements for success, especially when success is defined by the
ability of the school to raise the achievement of its students.4
Teachers are crucial given their daily contact with students in the
classroom. The effect of school principals is less direct but
nonetheless important. Effective school principals are able to provide
school environments that are more conducive to learning, and may be
more successful than their less effective peers in attracting,
supporting, and retaining high-quality teachers.5
Given the importance of teachers and principals, the central
question for this Article is how the quality of the teachers and
principals in high-poverty schools in North Carolina compares to that
in the schools serving more advantaged students. A related question
is why these differences arise. This inquiry is important for two
reasons. First, it relates directly to questions of social justice
interpreted as equal educational opportunity.6 Second, it bears on the
4. A number of recent empirical studies document the importance of teachers. See,
e.g., Jonah H. Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement:
Evidence from Panel Data, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 247-52 (2004) (assessing economic
data in an effort to delineate the importance of teachers to student achievement). One
strategy used in such studies is to allow the estimated intercepts in an equation explaining
variations in student achievement to differ across teachers. The variation in these
estimated intercepts is then interpreted as the variation in teacher "quality." Emerging
from such studies is the general consensus that a one standard deviation difference in the
quality of teachers as measured in this way generates about a 0.10 standard deviation in
achievement in math and a slightly smaller effect in reading. See Daniel Aaronson et al.,
Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools 2-30 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2002-28, 2003), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2002-28.pdf (utilizing this approach to conduct an
economic study involving the Chicago public school system).
5. See, e.g., KENNETH LEITHWOOD, UNIV. OF MINN. CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH
& EDUC. IMPROVEMENT, How LEADERSHIP INFLUENCES STUDENT LEARNING (2004),
http://www.wallacefunds.org/NR/rdonlyres/52BC34B4-2CC3-43D0-9541-9EA37F6D2086/
OHowLeadershiplnfluences.pdf.
6. The term "equal educational opportunity" has been used in different ways in the
literature. For this discussion, we define equal educational opportunity either as equal
educational inputs or as equal educational outcomes. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd, Reflections
on Equity, Adequacy, and Weighted Student Funding (Oct. 23, 2006) (unpublished paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In their classic discussion of
school finance equity, Berne and Stiefel use the term equal educational opportunity
somewhat differently. Berne and Stiefel use the term to refer to what is more commonly
called "fiscal neutrality." ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF
EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL
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operation of school-based accountability systems designed to put
pressure on school personnel to improve student achievement.7
One interpretation of equal educational opportunity is that it
requires that the quality of schooling provided to students be similar
across schools.8 In particular, it would require that students in high-
poverty schools have access to teachers and principals of similar
quality to those in schools serving more advantaged students. This
input standard of social justice is far less demanding than an
alternative standard defined in terms of equality of educational
outcomes. Under an outcome standard, equality of resources would
not be sufficient. Instead, the schools serving disadvantaged students
would need to have more-or higher quality-resources than the
other schools to compensate for the educational disadvantages that
children from disadvantaged families typically bring to the
classroom.9
Assuming that one is using inputs as the unit of measurement,
the weaker standard of input equality is more straightforward, and
the departures from it are easier to quantify than is the case with the
more ambitious outcome standard. This conclusion follows, in part,
because of the analytic difficulty in determining what precise
distribution of inputs would generate equal educational outcomes.
Without a clear picture of the required distribution, it is difficult to
determine how the actual distribution departs from the required
distribution. Moreover, the outcome standard raises some thorny
DIMENSIONS 17 (1984). In a fiscally neutral system, all school districts within a state have
an equal opportunity to attain a given level of per-student spending with a given tax rate.
Id.
7. Educational accountability systems, as typified by the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, generally hold each school accountable for the test scores of its students. See 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. II 2002). Any systematic unevenness in the distribution of
teachers across schools could make it more difficult for some schools to meet the required
achievement standards.
8. For a more comprehensive discussion of this standard, see generally Ladd, supra
note 6 (describing and explaining this interpretation that the quality of public schooling
should be similar for all students). See also EDWARD B. FISKE & HELEN F. LADD,
ELUSIVE EQUITY: EDUCATION REFORM IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (2004)
(applying this particular standard of educational reform to post-apartheid South Africa).
9. See Ladd, supra note 6 (addressing the distribution of school resources under an
outcome standard to educational opportunity); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS
AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM To CLOSE
THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004); Fabio D. Waltenberg & Vincent
Vandenberghe, What Does It Take To Achieve Equality of Opportunity in Education? An
Empirical Investigation Based on Brazilian Data, ECON. EDUC. REV. (forthcoming 2007 or
2008) (manuscript at 20-21, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (addressing the
political feasibility of allocating additional resources to impoverished schools in an effort
to achieve an equal educational outcome).
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issues about the extent to which schooling alone can and should be
expected to offset the adverse effects of economic and social
disadvantages."0 In any case, the departures from equity defined in
terms of the equality of educational inputs that emerge in this Article
may be interpreted as minimum-bound estimates of departures from
the more ambitious outcome standard."
Schools in North Carolina are currently subject to the
requirements of the state's ABCs accountability program and to
those of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB"). 12
Such efforts to hold schools accountable for student achievement
make the most sense when schools have equal capacity to perform
well. 3 But to the extent that the labor market for teachers and
principals works to the disadvantage of the high-poverty schools, that
10. Objections have been raised on both philosophical and practical grounds. For an
example of the philosophical objections, see Amy Gutmann's discussion of why equal
opportunity defined in terms of outcomes at the level of the individual student is too
ambitious an equity standard. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 131-32
(1987). That line of argument leads her in the direction of adequacy and the concept of
the threshold level of education necessary to assure that all students will be able to
participate fully in the democratic life of the country. The more practical objection is that
any serious effort to close achievement gaps will require a variety of social policies that are
not part of the traditional school system.
11. Technically, this statement would not hold true under all conditions. However,
the statement does hold true for the situation described in this Article because schools
with the most challenging-to-educate students have the least qualified teachers and
principals. Thus, by an input standard of equal opportunity, those schools are
disadvantaged relative to those serving more affluent students. According to an outcome
standard of opportunity, the schools serving the hard-to-educate students would be even
further disadvantaged since their students are the most challenging to educate and hence
would require additional inputs to achieve any given outcome goal.
12. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578
(Supp. II 2002)). Among the provisions of that law are that each state must test all
students in reading and math in grades three to eight and that each school is expected to
make "adequate yearly progress" toward having all students achieve proficiency by 2014.
See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(2). See generally Brandi M. Powell, Take the Money or Run? The
Dilemma of the NoChild Left Behind Act for State and Local Governments, 6 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 153 (2005) (examining the impact of NCLB on state and local governments);
Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes, 12
WIDENER L. REV. 637 (2006) (providing a more critical analysis of the adverse effects of
NCLB on state and local governments). The ABCs accountability program in North
Carolina was enacted in 1996 and holds schools accountable for gains in their students'
achievement from one year to the next. For a general description of the ABCs program,
see generally DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, N.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., THE ABCS OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION (2006), available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/
accountability/reporting/abc/2005-06/abcsbrochure.pdf. The NCLB requirements were
incorporated into the state program for the 2002-03 school year. Id. at 2.
13. For a more complete discussion of using schools as the unit of accountability, see
Helen F. Ladd, School-Based Educational Accountability Systems: The Promise and the
Pitfalls, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 385, 390-95 (2001).
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view could be both counterproductive and unfair to the teachers and
principals in those schools.
The empirical analysis in this Article is based on rich
administrative data on teachers and school administrators in North
Carolina as provided by the North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction through the North Carolina Education Research Center
at Duke University. All identifying information was removed from
the files before we received them. Although the analysis is based on
North Carolina data, the findings are not unique to this state. Indeed,
other researchers-most notably Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff for
New York, and Betts, Reuben, and Danenberg for California-find,
as we do, that students attending high-poverty schools have access to
teachers with weaker qualifications than their counterparts employed
by schools serving more advantaged students.14 Given the differences
between North Carolina and these other states in terms of the power
of teacher unions and other aspects of the policy environment, the
consistency of the patterns across different states highlights the
importance of strong economic and other forces that transcend state
policy differences. Far less well studied and documented for other
states are patterns related to school principals.
The Article proceeds in Part I with the identification of high-
poverty schools. Part II then describes how high-poverty schools fare
relative to other schools in terms of the quality of their teachers and
principals. In Part III we discuss some of the reasons for the observed
patterns, and in Part IV we discuss the policy implications.
I. DEFINING HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS
We focus on schools rather than districts because studying the
latter would miss the potentially large differences among schools
within a district in terms of the characteristics of the students, the
quality of the teachers, and the quality of school leadership.
Moreover, given that both the Federal NCLB Act and the North
Carolina ABCs accountability program single out the school as the
unit of accountability, 5 it is logical to investigate the extent to which
schools of differing types are operating on a level playing field in
terms of their access to the teaching and leadership resources that are
14. See Lankford et al., supra note 1, at 37-62; BETTS ET AL., supra note 1, at 29-31.
15. See DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCrION, supra note 12, at 2 (reiterating that the
measures of accountability are "based on performance at the individual school rather than
the district level").
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essential for meeting the achievement goals required under those
accountability systems.
Throughout this Article we disaggregate the analysis by level of
school because elementary, middle, and high schools differ from one
another in important ways. 16 Elementary schools, for example, tend
to be smaller than schools at higher levels. This small size, together
with their neighborhood orientation and the economic and racial
segregation that characterizes residential housing patterns, means
that they often serve relatively homogeneous groups of students. In
addition, students at that level tend to be more willing than older
students to declare their eligibility for free lunch, which serves as our
measure of student poverty. 7  Finally, given the different
responsibilities of principals at the various levels, the labor markets
for teachers and principals may differ across the levels, although in
ways that are not fully clear.
We follow standard practice in the education literature and
measure poverty at the school level by the percentage of students
who applied for and were found eligible for the federally sponsored
free lunch program (those with incomes below 130% of the poverty
line).18 For simplicity of exposition, we refer to the fraction of
students eligible for free lunch as a school's poverty rate, even though
some students receiving this benefit come from families with incomes
somewhat above the federal poverty threshold.19 We then rank the
schools from high to low in terms of their poverty rates and divide the
16. For the purposes of our discussion, an elementary school is one that offers any of
the elementary school grades (kindergarten through fifth grade) and is not in another
category. A middle school is one that offers any grades between five and eight where a
plurality of the grades it offers are in this range. A high school is one that serves students
in grades nine through twelve where a plurality of grades are in this range. Schools
serving all grades are omitted from our analysis. Those schools serving all grades never
accounted for more than 2% of all schools.
17. See, e.g., FREDERIC B. GLANTZ ET AL., OFFICE OF ANALYSIS & EVALUATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCHOOL LUNCH ELIGIBLE NON-PARTICIPANTS 2-9 (1994),
available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/CNP/FILES/EligNonPart-Pt
1.pdf; CRAIG GUNDERSEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CERTIFYING ELIGIBILITY IN
THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM (2003), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/fanrr34/fanrr34-4/fanrr34-4.pdf; Phillip M. Gleason, Participation in the
National School Lunch Program and the School Breakfast Program, 61 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 213S, 214S-15S (1995).
18. For the purposes of our discussion, we define student poverty by the percentage of
students eligible for "free lunch" rather than "free and reduced-price lunch" because of
data constraints. Only the free lunch variable is available for all years of the data.
19. We do not believe that this simplification detracts from the overall findings of our
study as we are concerned with general trends and not the specific federal poverty
threshold.
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schools into quartiles based on the percentage of poor students in the
school. We define as "high-poverty schools" those in quartile one-
in other words, those with the highest poverty rates. Because this is a
relative, rather than absolute, definition there is no fixed threshold
that distinguishes high-poverty schools at each level. The lowest
observed poverty rate for elementary schools in quartile one in 2004
is 60%. The comparable figures are 53% for middle schools and 39%
for high schools.
The average measured rates of poverty differ by level of school
as shown in Table 1. In this and subsequent tables, we report
averages weighted by the size of the school. Hence, the
interpretation of the first entry in Table 1 is that about 74% of the
schoolmates of the typical student in a quartile one elementary school
are receiving free lunch. By construction, the average poverty rates
necessarily decline across quartiles. As can be seen, the greatest
absolute difference in the average percent poor emerges for
elementary schools. For reasons alluded to earlier-small size and
reluctance of older students to declare eligibility for free lunch21--it is
not surprising to find that the average poverty rate in the high-
poverty elementary schools exceeds that in the comparable middle
and high schools.
Table 1. Percent Poor by Poverty Quartile and Level of School, 2004.
(a erages weigh ted by size of school, percent)
Level of Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
School (high-poverty (low-poverty
schools) schools)
Elementary 73.9 49.3 34.6 16.8
Middle 66.4 44.2 31.9 16.6
High school 51.0 30.7 19.7 9.9
Source: See Table Al.
Additional information on the characteristics of the schools or
students in each quartile is reported in the Appendix (Table Al). As
shown there, the schools serving the more advantaged students tend
to be larger than the high-poverty schools. Hence, for any level of
schooling, if we were to order all students by the poverty rate in each
student's school, the median student would be in a school in the third
quartile. Also shown in that table is that the average poverty rates
are highly correlated with the percent of minority students across
quartiles and across levels. The percentages of minorities in the high-
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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poverty (quartile one) schools are 75.4% for elementary schools,
75.2% for middle schools, and 68.4% for high schools.
Emerging from Table 1 is clear evidence of significant
polarization of students across schools by their poverty status. Table
2 shows that this polarization of schools by income is greater in 2004
than it was in earlier years. Reported in this table are the average
poverty rates for quartile one and quartile four schools, where the
quartiles were redefined each year, for 1995, 1999, and 2004. The
table shows that the high-poverty schools have become poorer over
time, both absolutely and relative to the low-poverty schools. This
greater concentration over time of poor students in the high-poverty
schools exacerbates the educational challenges facing those schools.
Table 2. Poverty Rates for High- and Low-Poverty Schools, by
School Level for Selected Years, 1996-2004.
(weighted averages, in percent, except where noted)
Quartile 1 (high- Quartile 4 (low- Difference (quartile
poverty schools) poverty schools) 1 - quartile 4)
percentage points
Elementary Schools
1995 62.3 16.1 46.2
1999 68.2 16.9 51.3
2004 73.9 16.8 57.1
Middle Schools
1995 53.9 13.5 40.4
1999 57.8 15.0 42.8
2004 66.4 16.6 49.8
High Schools
1995 39.0 5.6 33.4
1999 41.8 7.2 34.6
2004 51.0 9.9 41.1
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the North
Carolina Education Research Data Center.
II. PATTERNS OF TEACHER AND PRINCIPAL QUALITY BY POVERTY
QUARTILE
The central question for this Article is how the quality of
teachers and principals in high-poverty schools compares to that in
low-poverty schools. Because we have no direct measure of teacher
or principal quality, we rely on various indirect measures. In the case
of teachers, we focus on the teacher credentials that have emerged in
our previous research as statistically significant determinants of
student achievement, with full recognition, however, that many other,
hard-to-measure characteristics are also important determinants of
2007] 1353
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teacher quality." For principals, we use a variety of measures that
include, but are not restricted to, credentials similar to those for
teachers.22
A. Patterns of Teacher Qualifications
The relevant credentials include the experience of teachers, the
competitiveness of the undergraduate institutions they attended, their
licensure test scores, and whether they are board-certified.23 Not
included in this list is the percentage of teachers who have a master's
degree, because we found no evidence that a master's degree
credential is associated with student achievement in North Carolina.24
Experience. We use as our measure of teacher experience the
percentage of teachers with less than three years of experience. We
measure experience in this way rather than as the average level of
teacher experience in a school because our previous research shows
that an additional year of experience in the earlier years of teaching
has much larger effects on student achievement than does an
additional year for a more experienced teacher. This focus on
inexperienced teachers reflects the fact that-no matter how effective
such teachers may ultimately become-their inexperience in the early
years of their teaching careers typically renders them less effective
than their more experienced counterparts. Other things equal, higher
percentages of inexperienced teachers indicate a lower-quality
teaching staff.
Quality of Undergraduate Institution. Available for each teacher
is the name of the undergraduate institution from which he or she
graduated. Following standard practice in the economics literature
on teacher quality, we assign to each institution a competitive ranking
21. Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of
Teacher Effectiveness, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 789, 797-99 (2006) [hereinafter Clotfelter
et al., Teacher-Student Matching]; Charles T. Clotfelter et al., How and Why Do Teacher
Credentials Matter for Student Achievement 26-28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12828, 2007) [hereinafter Clotfelter et al., How and Why], available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12828. A number of studies have attempted to measure
teacher quality in a way that accounts for the characteristics of teachers that are hard to
measure. See Aaronson et al., supra note 4, at 29 (concluding that "unobservables" greatly
affect teacher quality); Eric A. Hanushek et al., Do Higher Salaries Buy Better Teachers? 3
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7082, 1999) (arguing that teacher
salaries have only a "modest impact" on teacher mobility and student performance);
Rockoff, supra note 4, at 247-48 (using matched student-teacher panel data in order to
identify teacher fixed effects).
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Clotfelter et al., Teacher-Student Matching, supra note 21, at 797.
24. See id. at 799; Clotfelter et al., How and Why, supra note 21, at 27-28.
[Vol. 851354
HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS
based on information for the 1997-98 freshman class from the
Barron's College Admissions Selector. Barron's reports six
categories26 which we aggregated to four categories: uncompetitive,
competitive, very competitive, and unranked. Many of the state's
teacher preparation programs are offered by state institutions in the
competitive category. We use as our measure of the quality of the
undergraduate institution the percentage of teachers who graduated
from uncompetitive institutions. A higher percentage indicates a
lower-quality teaching force.
Licensure Type. The State of North Carolina has many types of
licenses which can be divided into three categories: regular, which
includes both initial and continuing licenses; lateral entry; and
"other. ' 27 Lateral-entry licenses are issued to individuals who hold at
least a bachelor's degree with a minimum 2.5 cumulative G.P.A. and
the equivalent of a college major in the area in which they are
assigned to teach.28 Such teachers must affiliate with a college or
university to complete prescribed coursework. 29 Currently the lateral-
entry licenses are issued for two years and can be renewed for a third
year.3" The "other" category includes a variety of provisional,
temporary, and emergency licenses.31 We use as our measure of
teacher licensure the percentage of teachers who do not have a
regular license. A higher percentage indicates a lower-quality
teaching force.
Licensure Test Scores. Teachers in North Carolina are required
to take and receive passing scores on various licensure tests in order
to receive a license, with the specific tests depending on the year, the
school level, or the subject.32 We normalized test scores for each of
25. See BARRON'S PROFILES OF AMERICAN COLLEGES 223-34 (Barron's Educ.
Series, Inc. ed., 23d ed. 1999).
26. Id. at 223.
27. See DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, N.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., POLICY MANUAL
(2006), http://sbepolicy.dpi.state.nc.us (follow "NCSBE Policy Manual Table of Contents"
hyperlink; then follow "Quality Teachers, Administrators, and Staff" hyperlink; then
follow "QP-A" hyperlink; then follow "QP-A-001" hyperlink).
28. LICENSURE SECTION, N.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., LATERAL ENTRY: CRITERIA
AND CONDITIONS 1 (2003), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/licensure/pdfs/IS-LE.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 27 (describing temporary and
emergency licenses). Given the requirements of NCLB, as of June 30, 2006, provisional
and emergency licenses are no longer being issued in "core academic subjects." North
Carolina State Board of Education, SBE Highlights (Feb. 5-6, 2003), http://www.nc
publicschools.org/sbehighlights/2003/02highlights.html.
32. See DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, N.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., POLICY MANUAL
(2006), http://sbepolicy.dpi.state.nc.us (follow "NCSBE Policy Manual Table of Contents"
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the major tests separately for each year the test was administered
based on means and standard deviations from test scores for all
teachers in our data set so that all licensure tests have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. This normalization makes the scores
comparable both across years and tests. For teachers with multiple
test scores in their personnel files, our teacher test score variable is
set equal to the average of all the scores for which we can perform the
normalization. Higher average test scores indicate a higher-quality
teaching staff.
National Board Certification. North Carolina has been a leader
in the national movement to have teachers certified by the National
Board for Professional Teaching Standards ("NBPTS") and provides
an incentive in the form of a 12% boost in pay for teachers to do SO. 33
Such certification, which requires teachers to put together a portfolio
and to complete a series of exercises and activities designed to test
their knowledge of material for their particular field, takes well over a
year. Higher percentages of NBPTS-certified teachers signify a
higher-quality teaching staff.
The patterns across poverty quartiles, which are reported in
Table 3, are strikingly consistent. In every case, the high-poverty
schools have the highest percentages of teachers with little
experience, who have graduated from less competitive undergraduate
institutions, and who have nonregular licenses relative to schools in
the other poverty quartiles. These higher percentages imply that the
high-poverty schools have teachers with weaker average
qualifications. Consistent with those patterns, average teacher test
scores are also the lowest in the high-poverty schools, as are their
shares of NBPTS-certified teachers.
The consistency of the patterns leaves no doubt that students in
the high-poverty schools are taught by teachers with lower
qualifications than those in the lower-poverty schools. Moreover, in
many cases the differences are large. Consider, for example, the
distribution of NBPTS-certified teachers. While 3.9% of the teachers
in high-poverty high schools are NBPTS certified, more than double
that percent are NBPTS-certified in the schools serving the most
advantaged students.
hyperlink; then follow "Quality Teachers, Administrators, and Staff" hyperlink; then
follow "QP-A" hyperlink; then follow "QP-A-003" hyperlink).
33. Department of Public Instruction, North Carolina State Board of Education,
National Board Certification, http://www.ncpublicschools.org/recuritment/nationalboard
certification (last visited May 3, 2007).
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Table 3. Credentials of Teachers by Level of School and by Poverty
Quartile, 2004.
(averages weighted by number of teachers in each school; percent
except where noted)
Teacher Credential Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(High-poverty (Low-poverty
schools) schools)
Elementary Schools
Less than three years 18.7 16.2 14.8 13.3
experience
Less competitive 25.9 21.9 19.0 15.4
undergraduate
institution
Non-regular license 9.6 6.4 5.0 4.8
Test scores (average) -0.138 -0.011 0.053 0.115
Board-certified 4.7 7.2 7.8 9.9
Middle Schools
Less than three years 24.6 19.2 15.1 13.9
experience
Less competitive 26.3 22.7 17.5 16.4
undergraduate
institution
Nonregular license 23.4 15.3 10.7 10.7
Test scores (average) -0.160 -0.056 0.026 0.061
Board-certified 3.2 4.8 7.2 9.2
High Schools
Less than three years 17.3 15.2 13.4 14.6
experience
Less competitive 27.4 19.6 15.4 14.2
undergraduate
institution
Nonregular license 20.5 17.7 14.1 13.3
Test scores (average) -0.057 0.032 0.105 0.117
Board-certified 4.1 7.9 9.4 9.9
Source: Calculated by the authors using
Carolina Education Research Data Center.
data from the North
Figure 1 displays the patterns for one of the credentials-teacher
test scores-across the poverty quartiles for all three levels. The
figure dramatically depicts how much lower the test scores of the
teachers in the high-poverty schools are relative to the average of test
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scores of all teachers (denoted by zero) and relative to those of
teachers in each of the higher quartiles.
These patterns are not unique to 2004. Table 4 illustrates the
patterns at five-year intervals for one of the credentials-the
percentage of inexperienced teachers. For simplicity, the table
includes just the high- and low-poverty schools. In nearly all cases,
the difference between the high- and low-poverty schools is positive,
indicating that-for each year-more of the teachers in the high-
poverty schools were inexperienced than in the more affluent schools.
The proportions of inexperienced teachers in high-poverty
schools rose noticeably between 1995 and 1999 but then declined
somewhat in the following five years-a pattern that also emerges for
the more affluent schools. The net effect of these changes, as shown
in the final column, is rising differentials across quartiles for the
elementary and middle schools, but a more mixed trajectory at the
high school level. At all three levels, however, the differences
between the percentages of inexperienced teachers in the high- and
low-poverty schools have increased over the ten-year period to the
disadvantage of the students in the high-poverty schools.
Figure 1. Teacher Test Scores by Level of School and by Poverty
Quartile, 2004.
(proportions of a standard deviation)
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Table 4. Teachers with Less than Three Years of Experience, High-
and Low-Poverty Schools, by School Level, Selected Years, 1995-
2004.
(weighted average in percent, except where noted)
Quartile 1 (high- Quartile 4 (low- Difference (quartile 1 -
poverty schools) poverty schools) quartile 4) percentage
points
Elementary Schools
1995 17.4 14.5 2.9
1999 21.5 16.2 5.3
2004 18.7 13.2 5.4
Middle Schools
1995 19.5 16.4 3.2
1999 26.0 18.8 7.2
2004 24.6 13.9 10.7
High Schools
1995 13.4 14.0 -0.5
1999 18.7 15.5 3.2
2004 17.2 14.5 2.7
source: Ijalculatecl oy tne autnors using
Carolina Education Research Data Center.
Note: Due to rounding, the figures in the
may not exactly correspond to the differences
"Quartile 1" and "Quartile 4" columns.
aata trom Me i'ortn
"Difference" column
of the figures in the
B. Patterns of Principal Quality
Measuring the quality of principals is more challenging because
there is no body of empirical literature comparable to that for
teachers that links the measurable credentials of principals to gains in
student achievement. Moreover, any relationship between the quality
of principals and student achievement is less direct than that applying
to teachers. Our strategy is to use a range of measures, some of which
are comparable to those for teachers and others of which are more
closely related to the leadership skills of the principal. The following
are proxies for principal quality.
Principal Test Scores. Our data show that the vast majority of
principals in the State of North Carolina have Praxis III exams on
record in the areas in which they taught before moving into
administration. We normalized the test scores to make them
comparable across years and across tests. Most of those who were
licensed as teachers in the late 1980s and 1990s also have National
34. Praxis II is an assessment that tests "knowledge of specific subjects that K-12
educators will teach, as well as general and subject-specific teaching skills and knowledge."
Praxis II Overview, http://www.ets.org/praxis/prxaboutII.html (last visited May 3, 2007).
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Teacher's Examination ("NTE") scores on file, which we also
standardized across years. Since 1997, principals have been required
to pass a standardized test of basic leadership skills, the School
Leaders Licensure Assessment ("SLLA"). 35 Hence we also use these
scores, in normalized form, for the principals for whom they are
available.
Competitiveness of the Principal's Undergraduate Institution.
Following the procedure we used for the teachers, we categorized the
institutions using the Barron's ratings. A principal who attended a
highly competitive institution might be expected to exhibit greater
ambition and focus, greater intelligence, or more monetary or
political resources than a principal who attended a less competitive
college.
Principal Experience. Although we do not know when principals
first became principals, we do have information on when they first
were licensed as assistant principals. From that, we can calculate the
years that they have been school administrators. The greater
familiarity with procedures that comes with more administrative
experience might be expected to make a principal more effective.
Additionally, if a principal remains in administration over a long
period of time, that could potentially indicate success in the job.
Principal Leadership Rating. In 2002 the Governor's office
administered a survey of teacher working conditions ("TWC"). 3 6
From the results of this extensive survey, we used factor analysis to
construct a leadership factor rating for each teacher-respondent and
averaged those ratings by school. The items correlating most highly
with the leadership factor were those asking teachers to assess the
school leader's vision for the school, responsiveness to concerns about
leadership, and the general strength of leadership.37 Because the
survey was administered only once, it provides a measure of
leadership quality just for the set of principals who were teaching in
that year.
35. See DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 32.
36. See EDUC. OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF N.C., NC TEACHER
WORKING CONDITIONS SURVEY (2002), http://www.governor.state.nc.us/Office/
Education/TeacherWorkingConditions Survey.asp.
37. Justin Wheeler, An Analysis of Principal Turnover, Distribution, and
Effectiveness in the State of North Carolina 7, 29-30 (Apr. 21, 2006) (unpublished
master's project, Duke University) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). For
more details on the construction of the leadership ratings, see id. The measure appears to
be moderately reliable, but is not available for all schools because of nonresponse.
Moreover, average leadership ratings differed systematically by the characteristics of the
school. Id.
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The patterns across poverty quartiles for all levels in 2004 are
reported in Table 5. Included with each entry is the number of
principals in the sample. These sample sizes differ because of missing
data for large numbers of principals for some of the measures. The
data are most complete for the Praxis II scores, tenure in the school,
and the two measures of the undergraduate college. For all but the
last row, higher numbers represent higher quality.
Table 5. Proxies for Principal Quality by Poverty Quartile, All
Levels, 2004.
(weighted averages, sample sizes in parentheses)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(high-poverty (low-poverty
schools) schools)
Praxis score -0.29 (465) 0.08 (487) 0.18 (500) 0.21 (435)
NTE score -0.37 (284) -0.04 (322) 0.13 (332) 0.26 (283)
SLLA score -0.14 (94) 0.23 (89) 0.55 (87) 0.14 (52)
Leadership -0.19 (216) 0.04 (232) 0.05 (260) 0.05 (227)
rating
Tenure in the 3.74 (480) 4.08 (505) 4.00 (514) 4.20 (444)
school (years)
Competitive 0.13 (469) 0.17 (497) 0.18 (505) 0.23 (433)
undergraduate
institution
(proportion)
Less 0.35 (469) 0.27 (497) 0.19 (505) 0.19 (433)
competitive
undergraduate
institution
(proportion)
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the North
Carolina Education Research Center.
Despite the differing sample sizes and nature of the measures,
the patterns are very consistent across poverty quartiles. For the
three test measures at the top of the table, the average test scores in
the high-poverty schools are below the statewide average of zero.
That is also true for the leadership rating. The comparable measures
in the low-poverty schools are all higher-with the difference ranging
from about 0.3 to 0.5 standard deviations. The only difference that is
not statistically significant across the quartiles is the principal's tenure
at the school. The final two rows show that the principals in high-
poverty schools are less likely to have attended a competitive
undergraduate institution and more likely to have come from a less
competitive institution. Thus, regardless of the measure used, the
principals in the high-poverty schools consistently score worse on
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these numerical quality measures than those in the more affluent
schools.
The patterns for three of the measures are shown in Figure 2. As
we show later, the distribution across quartiles for these three
measures for the sub-sample of new principals is similar to this
distribution.
Figure 2. Qualifications of All Principals Across Schools, Grouped by
Quartile of Student Poverty, All Levels, 2004.
.2 Mean Leadership
Mean Praxis 11 -
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III. EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS
Much has been written about why such patterns emerge for
teachers, but less has been written for principals." The main story for
teachers is based on the normal functioning of teacher labor markets.
38. See, e.g., Clotfelter et al., supra note 1, at 381-85; Lankford et al., supra note 1, at
53-55. See generally BETTS ET AL., supra note 1, at iv (concluding "that schools with
larger populations of economically disadvantaged students have fewer teaching resources"
and "that differences in the socioeconomic background of students explain most of the
variation in student achievement").
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A. Teacher Turnover and Movement
One part of the story is what happens within districts. Teachers
presumably care about both money and working conditions when
they are making employment decisions, and among the factors that
can affect working conditions are the characteristics of a school's
students. To the extent that low-income students come to school less
ready to learn and with weaker educational support at home than
those from more advantaged backgrounds, teachers may well
perceive that schools with large proportions of students from poor
families offer harsher working environments than those schools
serving more advantaged students. This perception, combined with
the fact that teacher salary schedules are usually uniform within each
district, implies that teachers tend to prefer to teach in schools serving
more advantaged students than in schools with large proportions of
low-income students.39 Thus, within a district, there is a tendency to
trade up-that is, for existing teachers to transfer out of the high-
poverty schools and to move to the more advantaged schools. The
potential for them to do so will vary across districts depending on the
openings in the more advantaged schools and the nature of the
internal transfer policy. In most cases, teachers within the system are
given priority over new teachers when openings arise.' As a result of
these policies, any new teachers that the district hires are more likely
to end up in the high-poverty schools where there are openings. To
the extent that the new hires are novice teachers, the effect is to put
the least experienced teachers in the schools with the harshest
working conditions.
The story across districts is similar except for the role of salary
differentials. Even though North Carolina has a single statewide
teacher salary schedule, the addition of discretionary salary
supplements at the local level means that salary schedules differ
across school districts.41 To the extent that teachers are sufficiently
39. A recent careful analysis of teacher turnover in Georgia confirms the greater
tendency of teachers to leave high-poverty schools than other schools. See Benjamin P.
Scafidi et al., Race, Poverty, and Teacher Mobility, ECON. OF EDUC. REV. (forthcoming
2007 or 2008) (manuscript at 6, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The authors
conclude, however, that the driving force is the race of the students in those schools rather
than their poverty status. See id. at 2-3.
40. This unwritten procedure emerged clearly from a series of informal case studies of
school district personnel policies in North Carolina undertaken by the authors in 2000 and
2001.
41. Teach4NC.org, Frequently Asked Questions, http://teach4nc.org/faqs/#salaries
(last visited May 3, 2007). For state salary schedules, local salary supplements, and the
state salary manual, see Public Schools of North Carolina, Salary Guides, http://www.nc
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mobile to have options in more than one district, we would expect
them to move away from lower-paying districts in favor of more
generous districts-all other factors, including working conditions,
held constant.
Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide evidence in support of various parts of
this standard story. Table 6 reports turnover rates-defined as the
number of new teachers as a percentage of all teachers in each
school-and the percentages of the newly hired teachers who have no
experience, by poverty quartile. At all three levels, the patterns are
as predicted: the high-poverty schools have higher turnover rates and
higher proportions of novice teachers. The differences across poverty
quartiles are particularly large at the middle school level. In those
schools, the turnover rate of 26.6% in the high-poverty schools
exceeds that in the low-poverty schools by more than 40%. Further,
more than one-third of the newly hired middle school teachers have
no experience. Once again these patterns are not unique to 2004.
The patterns are essentially similar for every year from 1996 to 2004,
with both the turnover rate and the percentage of new hires who are
novice teachers almost always highest at the middle school level.
(Data by year are not shown.)
By defining turnover as the proportion of teachers who are new
to a school in a given year, in some cases we may be confounding
turnover with enrollment growth. A school experiencing rapid
growth in enrollment, and hence hiring many new teachers, for
example, will appear to have high turnover rates in our analysis, even
if very few of the teachers working in that school depart in a given
year. Thus, to the extent that rapidly growing schools tend to be
located in more affluent, growing communities, the pattern in Table 6
may understate disparities in true turnover rates.42
publicschools.org/fbs/finance/salary (last visited May 3, 2007). The state salary manual
dictates the state-level salary schedules, and each local school district can determine their
own supplements. Id.
42. An alternative to the analysis in Table 6 would examine the frequency of
departures from a school. In previous work, we have used departures as a measure of
turnover. Just as arrivals data confound turnover with growth, however, departure data
confound turnover with enrollment decline. We have chosen to present the results in
Table 6 so as not to overstate the differences. See Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Do School
Accountability Systems Make It More Difficult for Low-Performing Schools To Attract and
Retain High-Quality Teachers?, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251, 256-58 (2004)
[hereinafter Clotfelter et al., School Accountability Systems]; Charles Clotfelter et al.,
Would Higher Salaries Keep Teachers in High-Poverty Schools? Evidence from a Policy
Intervention in North Carolina 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12285, 2006) [hereinafter Clotfelter et al., Higher Salaries], available at http://papers.n
ber.org/papers/ w12285.
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Table 6. Teacher Turnover Rates and Percentages of Novice
Teachers by Level, 2004.
(weighted averages, percent)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(high-poverty (low-poverty
schools) schools)
Elementary Schools
Turnover rate 23.0 20.1 19.4 18.8
Novice teachers 30.7 30.7 30.6 25.2
as a % of new
hires
Middle Schools
Turnover rate 26.6 22.8 20.2 18.5
Novice teachers 35.2 34.8 31.1 26.1
as a % of new
hires
High Schools
Turnover rate 23.5 19.7 18.7 21.1
Novice teachers 35.0 31.9 29.3 26.1
as a % of new
hires
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the North
Carolina Education Research Center.
The high rates of teacher turnover in the high-poverty schools
not only help explain the patterns we described in Part II above but
also exert their own harmful effects. High turnover rates are
disruptive and make it difficult for schools to develop coherent
educational programs and to provide consistent programming from
one year to the next.
Table 7 illustrates the movement of elementary school teachers
over the period 1999 to 2004. The first row for each level of schooling
is the number of teachers in each poverty quartile in 1999, and
subsequent rows show the percentages of the original number who
were in the same school, who transferred to another school in the
same district, who transferred to another school in a different district,
and who were no longer in the data set, either because they left the
state, moved out of the public school system, or left teaching.
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Table 7. Movement of Teachers by Initial Poverty Quartile,
Elementary Schools, 1999-2004.
(percentage of 1999 number, except as indicated)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(high-poverty (low-poverty
schools) schools)
Teachers in 3,132 2,988 2,953 3,142
1999 with 0-5
years of
experience
(number)
Stayed in same 27.0 30.2 33.9 34.0
school
Moved to a 17.9 18.7 17.9 16.4
school in same
local
educational
authority
Moved to a 16.4 12.6 11.2 9.7
school in
different district
Out of data set 38.7 38.6 37.1 39.9
or left teaching
The patterns are generally consistent with expectations. Of most
interest are the differences across quartiles in the percentages of
teachers who stayed in the same school and those who moved to a
different district. Consistent with the pattern of turnover rates
described above, only about 27% of the teachers in the high-poverty
schools were still in the same school five years later, in contrast to
34% in the more affluent schools. Among those who stayed in the
state but moved to a different school, a far greater proportion in the
high-poverty schools moved to a different district, presumably as a
way either to increase their salary or to improve their working
conditions.43
Not shown in the table are the patterns for middle and high
school teachers. At the middle school level, the percentage of
teachers who remained in the same schools for five years was only
22.2% in high-poverty schools, in contrast to 31% in the more
affluent schools. Across quartiles of high schools the percentages
who remained ranged from 26.5% to 37%.
Among the teachers who change schools, we predict that the
moves on average improve their working conditions, as reflected by a
reduction in the percentages of low-income students in the school.
43. In future work, we plan to investigate these moves in more detail.
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Table 8 indicates that that is the case, and especially so for the
teachers moving from high-poverty schools. We show the percent of
poor students in the initial schools and the new schools for all
teachers who changed schools between 1999 and 2004, by level of
school and also for the subset of movers who started in high-poverty
schools. As shown in the final column, at the elementary and middle
school levels, the typical teacher who moved ended up in a school
with a slightly lower poverty rate, but that was not true for the typical
mover at the high school level. Shifting the focus to teachers who
started out in high-poverty schools, we see that teachers at all three
levels moved to schools with far lower rates of poverty. Poverty rates
in the new schools averaged 22.5 percentage points lower for
elementary school movers, 18.3 points lower for middle school
movers, and 13.9 points lower for high school movers.
Table 8. Poverty Rates in Old and New Schools for Teachers Who
Changed Schools During the Period Between 1999 and 2004, by Level
of School for All Teachers Who Changed Schools and for the Subsets
of Teachers Who Moved from High-Poverty Schools.
(Percent, exce t where noted)
Difference
Poverty Rate in Old Poverty Rate in New vs. Old
School Level School New School (percentage points)
Elementary-all 38.1 36.8 -1.3
Elementary-high- 67.1 44.6 -22.5
poverty
Middle-all 30.7 29.2 -1.5
Middle-high- 56.6 38.3 -18.3
poverty
High school-all 17.6 18.2 0.7
High school-high- 38.3 24.4 -13.9
poverty I _II
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the North
Carolina Education Research Center.
In additional analysis not shown here, we calculated similar
figures for teachers in each of the state's five largest districts who
moved from one school to another, but stayed within the same
district. In each case, we defined high-poverty schools relative to
other schools in the district, rather than to the state as a whole. For
three of the five districts-Forsyth County, Guilford County, and
Mecklenburg County-the average reduction in the school poverty
rate experienced by elementary teachers who moved away from
schools that were defined as high-poverty within the district exceeded
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the 22.5% average reduction for all such moves in the state. The
average reductions were 27.4% in Forsyth, 30.8% in Guilford, and
26.4% in Mecklenburg. In Cumberland County, the average
reduction mirrored that for the state. Only in Wake County was the
reduction smaller at only 11.5 percentage points. This smaller figure
for Wake largely reflects that county's effort to balance the
socioeconomic mix of students across schools."a As a result, the high-
poverty schools in that county-that is, those in the first quartile-
had an average poverty rate of only 44.2%, far lower than the average
rates above 75% for the first quartile in each of the other large
districts. Even in that county, however, teachers who started out in
relatively high-poverty schools moved to those with lower rates of
poverty.
This tendency of teachers to move away from schools with high
rates of poverty to those with lower rates of poverty-either by
moving within a district or by moving to a school in another district-
is thus an important part of the explanation for the inequities across
poverty quartiles depicted earlier.
Two other factors are also worth noting. The first is the finding
from research in New York State that teachers prefer to teach close
to where they grew up or in schools similar to the ones they attended.
In that state, more than three out of five teachers who began their
teaching careers between 1999 and 2002 started teaching in a district
within fifteen miles of the district in which they attended high school
and five out of six started teaching within forty miles.45 This
preference to return home can make it hard for schools in some large
urban areas and some rural areas to attract teachers.46 Moreover, to
the extent that prospective teachers in those areas were educated in
low-quality high schools, schools in those areas may end up hiring
teachers from a pool of applicants that have relatively weak
qualifications.47
The second is evidence from North Carolina that the State's
ABCs accountability program has exacerbated the challenge that low-
performing schools, many of which are likely to be high-poverty
44. See Sara Rimer, Schools Try Integration by Income, Not Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2003, at Al (highlighting Wake County's socioeconomic integration program).
45. SUSANNA LOEB & MICHELLE REININGER, PUBLIC POLICY AND TEACHER
LABOR MARKETS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY IT MATTERS 48 (2004), available at
http://www.epc.msu.edu/publications/publications.htm.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 49-50 (noting particularly the problems urban areas face in retaining
teachers).
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schools, face in retaining teachers.48 That outcome occurs because the
accountability system gives teachers yet another incentive to leave the
high-poverty, low-performing schools: the higher probability of
receiving a financial bonus that comes with being a successful school
and the negative effect of being in a school that is publicly identified
as failing to meet the needs of its students.49
B. Principal Turnover and Movement
Many of the labor market dynamics that apply to teachers are
likely to apply to principals as well. Other considerations, however,
are also relevant. In many cases principals may advance into the
principalship from the schools or districts in which they have taught."
Policies that permit principals to retain their career status as teachers
only within the districts where they received tenure may create a
disincentive for them to move across districts.51 Thus the presence of
less qualified principals in the high-poverty schools may simply reflect
the presence of less qualified teachers in those schools. In addition,
principals are under the scrutiny of the district and the public to a
much higher degree than teachers and are more likely to be held
individually accountable for school performance.52 As a result they
may be more likely than teachers to leave the principalship or move
to another school under duress or at the behest of a superintendent.
This public scrutiny and accountability for student achievement could
well result in higher turnover of principals in high-poverty schools,
and also higher rates than before accountability pressures became
widespread.53 Whether it leads to higher- or lower- quality principals
in such schools is hard to predict since that depends on the extent to
which the district policymakers are committed to improving the
quality of the leadership in those schools.
48. Id. at 50.
49. See generally Clotfelter et al., School Accountability Systems, supra note 42.
50. Id. at 255.
51. See, e.g., SUSAN M. GATES ET AL., CAREER PATHS OF SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS IN NORTH CAROLINA: INSIGHTS FROM AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
DATA (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2005/RANDTR1
29.pdf.
52. See, e.g., FRANK C. PAPA, JR. ET AL., THE ATTRIBUTES AND CAREER PATHS OF
PRINCIPALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING POLICY 1 (2002), available at http://www.
emsc.nysed.gov/csl/resources/Attributes of Principals.pdf (noting the multiplicity of roles
played by principals, including "represent[ing] the school with a variety of external
audiences regarding performance, resources, and community relations").
53. GATES ET AL., supra note 51, at 65-66 (noting that principal turnover is greater at
schools with a higher proportion of minority students than at schools in wealthier
counties).
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Figures 3 and 4 provide some insight into the patterns of
principal turnover and movement. As in previous tables and figures,
averages are weighted by school size unless otherwise noted.
Ultimately, they suggest that these patterns are largely in keeping
with those observed among teachers.
Figure 3 shows principal turnover rates by poverty quartile from
1996 to 2004. Though turnover rates vary considerably across years
and poverty quartiles, the high-poverty schools exhibit the highest
turnover in all years except 2004. Moreover, as we predicted, the
turnover rates of principals in these schools have been higher since
the introduction of the State's accountability system in the 1996-97
school year than in the years 1996 and 1997. Further exacerbating the
challenges of the schools serving poor students is that the new
principals they receive are more likely to be new to the principalship.
Over the period of analysis, 66.6% of principals new to a school in
which the majority of students are poor are novice principals; the
equivalent figure for schools without a majority of poor students is
60.3% .
A comparison by poverty quartile of the characteristics of the
novice principals strongly suggests that principal sorting is largely a
result of patterns of entry into the principalship. Figure 4 portrays
the distribution of principal qualifications across quartiles of student
poverty as shown earlier in Figure 2, but now for novice principals
rather than all principals. The patterns are similar in the two figures.
As shown here, the new principals in schools with the highest poverty
once again have the lowest test scores and leadership ratings and have
attended competitive colleges at significantly lower rates. To the
extent that principals tend to rise to the assistant principalship from
teaching positions and later, to the principalships within the same
school, this unequal distribution of new principals may well be
attributable to teacher sorting.
54. The difference in first-time principals across majority poor and minority poor
schools is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The percentages presented are not
weighted in this case.
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Figure 3. Principal Turnover Rates in Schools by Quartile of Student
Poverty, All Levels, 1996-2004.
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Finally, Table 9 illustrates the relationship between student
poverty and the movement of principals between schools. The first
two rows show that principals leaving elementary and middle schools
moved into schools of the same level with student poverty rates, on
average, 5.0 and 7.1 percentage points lower than at their schools of
origin. Both these differences are statistically significant, as is the 4.8
percentage point difference across all schools. Only for high schools
does this pattern not hold.55
Table 9. Poverty Rates in Old and New Schools for Principals Who
Changed Schools Between 1996 and 2004.
(percent exce pt where noted)
Sample Size Poverty Rate in Poverty Rate in Difference New vs. Old
School Level (Number) Old School New School (percentage points) P-value
Elementary 328 48.7 43.7 -5.0 0.00
Middle 47 41.8 34.6 -7.1 0.01
High 34 22.1 22.8 +0.7 0.81
All levels 409 45.7 40.9 -4.8 0.00
Note: Full sample includes all principal moves from FY1996 through FY2006 in which the
school of origin and recipient school were of the same level. School poverty measure for both
school of origin and new school are for the year prior to the principal's move.
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main purpose of this Article is to document the extent to
which the qualifications of the teachers and principals in high-poverty
schools fall short of those in more affluent schools in North Carolina
and to provide some sense of why those patterns emerge. For anyone
familiar with schools and the operation of teacher labor markets, the
emergence of these shortfalls should come as no surprise.56
Nonetheless, the consistency of the findings across all credentials for
both principals and teachers and over time is remarkable and quite
striking. Given the consistency of the patterns for the credentials that
we were able to measure, it is reasonable to assume that similar
patterns might well emerge for many other unmeasured credentials.
By the input standard of equal educational opportunity that we
referred to in the Introduction, we conclude that the inequities with
respect to the distribution of teacher and principal qualifications are
55. The sample of high school to high school and middle school to middle school
principal moves are small, in part, because the majority of principals leaving high schools
and middle schools move to schools of another level (62% and 63%, respectively).
56. See supra Part III.A.
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large in North Carolina and that they clearly work to the
disadvantage of the students in the high-poverty schools. In addition,
such differences raise questions about where blame should be placed
for the failure of such schools to raise student achievement to the
desired levels. Although some of the high-poverty schools could
undoubtedly put the resources they have to better use, this study
highlights the more systemic problem that such schools face, namely
that given the way the teacher and principal labor markets work it is
difficult for them to attract and retain high-quality teachers and
principals. Thus, if policymakers are serious about improving high-
poverty schools, they will have to alter the way the labor markets for
teachers and principals work in order to make high-poverty schools
more competitive.
Before turning to one approach for moving in that direction, we
briefly summarize the evidence from our previous research on how
the credentials of teachers and principals affect student achievement.
A. Teacher Credentials and Student Achievement
Determining the causal relationship between teacher credentials
and student achievement is a challenge, in part, because of the
patterns we have documented in this Article-namely, that teachers
with the strongest credentials gravitate toward the schools with the
most advantage and the higher achievement. Without careful
attention to the way teachers and students are matched-not only
across schools but also across classrooms within schools-it is difficult
to isolate the causal effect of credentials on student achievement.
Using the rich administrative data on students and teachers for North
Carolina that permits the matching of student and teacher records
over time, we have been able to make progress in estimating true
causal relationships, at least at the elementary level. 7
Our findings related to the credentials described earlier are
illustrated in Table 10. This table compares how the estimated effects
on student achievement differ between a baseline teacher with the
credentials listed in the first column and a teacher with the weaker
credentials shown in the second column. The illustrative baseline
teacher is assumed to have ten years of experience, to have graduated
from a competitive college, to hold a regular license, and to have
obtained an average score on her licensure tests. In addition, she is
National Board-certified. The illustrative teacher with weaker
57. See, e.g., Clotfelter et al., Higher Salaries, supra note 42; Clotfelter et al., Teacher-
Student Matching, supra note 21.
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credentials is a novice teacher, graduated from an uncompetitive
college, has a test score one standard deviation below average and is
not board-certified. For both math and reading the table reports two
sets of estimated average effects. These results emerge from two
versions of a carefully specified model designed to explain variations
in student achievement in grades four and five, and we interpret them
as lower- and upper-bound estimates of the true effects of the
credentials.58
Emerging from the table is that the average effect on a student's
achievement in math of having a teacher with the weaker set of
credentials is negative and of the order of 0.15 to 0.20 standard
deviations. The effects for reading are also negative but somewhat
smaller in magnitude. As we have shown in our prior research, the
negative effects associated with having a teacher with poor credentials
are clearly detrimental to student achievement but are not as harmful
as having poorly educated parents. 9 In contrast, the negative effects
of having a teacher with weak credentials in math are generally
comparable in size to those associated with having poorly educated
parents.' Hence the effects are large and very relevant for policy.
The estimates in Table 10 are only illustrative and overstate the
differential effects across types of schools, given that no school has all
strong or all weak teachers. Nonetheless, we report them here to
emphasize that the patterns described in Part II, which consistently
document the weaker credentials of teachers in the high-poverty
schools relative to those in the more affluent schools, adversely affect
the achievement of the students in the high-poverty schools.
Moreover, the adverse effects would cumulate over all the years a
student attended a high-poverty school.
58. See Clotfelter et al., Teacher-Student Matching, supra note 21; Clotfelter et al.,
How and Why, supra note 21.
59. Clotfelter et al., How and Why, supra note 21, at 31, 39.
60. Id. at 31.
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Table 10. Effects on Achievement: Subject Teacher vs. Baseline
Teacher.
Difference in achievement
Baseline Teacher Subject Teacher (Weak (lower- and upper-bound estimates)
Credentials) Math Reading
low high low high
Ten years of No experience -0.079 -0.094 -0.053 -0.072
experience
Competitive Noncompetitive -0.007 -0.010 * *
undergraduate college undergraduate college
Regular license Other license -0.033 -0.059 -0.017 -0.024
Licensure test score is Licensure test is 1 SD
average below the average -0.011 -0.015 -0.003 -0.004
National Board- Not National Board- -0.020 -0.028 -0.012 -0.012
certified certified
Total difference -0.150 -0.206 0.085 -0.112
• signifies coefficient is not statistically significant
Source: Clotfelter et al., Teacher-Student Matching, supra note 21.
B. Principal Qualifications and Student Achievement
Though common sense suggests that the differences across
poverty quartiles in the qualifications of principals matter for the
success of the school, whatever implications they have for student
achievement are indirect and hard to measure. Nonetheless, in prior
research, one of us has found support for the conclusion that
differences in some of our measures of principal quality matter.61
That evidence is of two types: evidence that principals with better
credentials generate better schoolwide outcomes as measured by the
percentage of students who reach proficiency (based on state
standards) and evidence that such principals are more successful in
attracting and retaining high-quality teachers than is the case for
principals with weaker qualifications.62
The evidence emerges from analyses that take into account the
fact that principals with better qualifications tend to select into
schools with higher-performing students and higher-quality teachers.63
Failure to account for this sorting process would generate estimates
that overstate the causal impact of principals since part of any
measured relationship would simply reflect the sorting process. In
particular, we identify the effects of principals with the use of
empirical models that control statistically for both the observed and
61. See Wheeler, supra note 37, at 19-23.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 14.
2007] 1375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
unobserved characteristics of the schools.6' In effect, we identify the
effects of principals by the movements of principals with differing
characteristics into and out of schools, with attention to the time the
principal stays in a school. In this way, it is possible to isolate the
causal effects of principal credentials on outcomes rather than simply
the correlations.
Among the results are the following. A principal's leadership
rating appears to have statistically significant positive, but relatively
modest, effects on the proportions of students who are proficient in
primary schools and high schools, though not in middle schools. All
other factors held constant, the percentage of students who are
proficient would be about five percentage points higher in a high
school run by a principal with a very high leadership rating than in a
comparable high school run by a principal with a very low leadership
rating.6" In addition, having attended a competitive college rather
than an uncompetitive college is associated with a marginally
significant positive effect on student proficiency at both the middle
and high school levels.
In addition, the analysis indicates that one of the mechanisms by
which highly rated principals with longer tenure in their schools
improve student achievement is through their ability to reduce
teacher turnover and to staff their schools with more qualified
teachers. The results indicate that principals with moderately high
leadership ratings reduce teacher turnover rates by about 2.6
percentage points compared to principals with average leadership
ratings in elementary schools.' In addition, an additional year of
tenure in a school predicts a reduction of teacher turnover at all three
levels of schooling.67 Finally, higher principal leadership ratings are
associated with the ability to attract stronger teachers as measured by
their test scores and by their experience as a teacher.68
64. The technical term for these models are fixed effects models, where the fixed
effects of each school are captured by 0-1 indicator variables for each school.
65. Wheeler, supra note 37, at 22. This analysis was restricted to the principals for
whom leadership ratings were available and assumed that the 2002 leadership ratings
applied to the principal in other years.
66. Id. at 23.
67. While one might expect an effective new principal's first year or two to be
associated with higher turnover of teachers as he or she pushes out teachers perceived to
be ineffective, Wheeler finds no evidence of that type of "cleaning house." Id.
68. Id. at 24.
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C. Policy Considerations
To counter the strong economic forces that generate the
disparities in teacher and principal credentials across schools, new
policy strategies will need to be developed. One approach might be
to try to increase the overall supply of quality teachers in the state,
with the hope that a larger supply will ease the problems faced by the
high-poverty schools.69 An alternative approach would focus directly
on making it more attractive for teachers to teach in high-poverty
schools. Though a full discussion of policy strategies is beyond the
scope of this Article, we briefly describe one possible policy option
that has been informed by our previous research.
As evidenced by the movement of both teachers and principals
away from high-poverty schools, it is clear that teachers and
principals find the combination of compensation and working
conditions in such schools less attractive than that available in more
affluent schools. Thus, it seems reasonable to consider policies
designed either to improve the working conditions or to raise the
salaries available in high-poverty schools. Although there is debate in
the literature regarding the power of higher salaries to convince
teachers to work in high-poverty schools,7" our previous research
suggests that modest targeted increases in salary can reduce turnover
rates in such schools.71 In that study, we measured the impact of a
short-lived North Carolina program that paid an annual bonus of
$1,800 to certified math, science, and special education teachers in
high-poverty or low-performing middle and high schools.72
Importantly, the bonus was not designed as a one-time bonus but
rather as one that would continue as long as an eligible teacher
continued to teach in a school that was eligible. Based on
comparisons of the behavior of bonus-eligible teachers to ineligible
teachers in the same school, or in schools that barely missed the
criteria for participation in the program, we concluded that the bonus
generated a 12% decrease in turnover rates among the affected
69. For a discussion of this supply-oriented strategy in the North Carolina context, see
generally Dana Damico, The Shortage of Teachers in North Carolina: Can We Attract and
Retain Enough?, N.C. INSIGHT, Aug. 2004, at 2.
70. See, e.g., Hanushek et al., supra note 21, at 43 (arguing that teacher salaries have
only a modest impact on teacher mobility and student performance).
71. See Clotfelter et al., Higher Salaries, supra note 42, at 13.
72. Id.
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teachers.73 Moreover, this positive outcome emerged despite various
problems associated with the implementation of the program.74
More experimentation and evaluation of this and other strategies
are clearly needed if good policies are to be developed to address the
significant inequities described in this Article.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 21.
[Vol. 851378
HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS
APPENDIX
Table Al. Descriptive Information by Poverty Quartile and by Level
of School, 2004 (all averages are weighted by the number of students
in each school).
I Quartile 11 Quartile 21 Quartile 3 Quartile 41
Elementary Schools
tt of Schools 344 344 344 344
ft of Students 143,420 161,225 171,123 190,557
% of Students 21.5% 24.2% 25.7% 28.6%
Avg. School Size 490.9 538.1 574.7 669.6
Avg. Percent Poor 73.9% 49.3% 34.6% 16.8%
Avg. Percent Minority 75.4% 46.4% 30.8% 23.9%
% Schools in West N.C. 8.4% 29.1% 37.8% 19.5%
% Schools in Central N.C. 71.5% 53.8% 47.1% 71.5%
% Schools in East N.C. 20.1% 17.2% 15.1% 9.0%
Middle Schools
ft of Schools 112 113 113 113
# of Students 60,264 79,991 81,080 84,086
% of Students 19.7% 26.2% 26.5% 27.5%
Avg. School Size 657.4 787.7 791.8 895.7
Avg. Percent Poor 66.4% 44.2% 31.9% 16.6%
Avg. Percent Minority 75.2% 48.1% 31.6% 23.4%
% Schools in West N.C. 2.7% 23.9% 37.2% 21.2%
% Schools in Central N.C. 72.3% 53.1% 45.1% 68.1%
% Schools in East N.C. 25.0% 23.0% 17.7% 10.6%
High Schools
# of Schools 102 102 102 102
# of Students 65,881 108,295 123,453 88,843
% of Students 17.0% 28.0% 31.9% 23.0%
Avg. School Size 1,018.7 1,285.7 1,391.6 1,465.8
Avg. Percent Poor 51.0% 30.7% 19.7% 9.9%
Avg. Percent Minority 68.4% 44.9% 29.2% 21.7%
% Schools in West N.C. 6.9% 26.5% 40.2% 19.6%
% Schools in Central N.C. 63.7% 49.0% 44.1% 67.6%
% Schools in East N.C. 29.4% 24.5% 15.7% 12.7%
Source: Calculated by the authors with data
Carolina Education Research Data Center.
from the North
20071 1379
1380 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
